Kenya Politics

The Fuel Strike Did Not Just Expose ODM’s Experts. It Exposed the Broad-Based Bargain.

Kenya's two-day national transport strike in mid-May did more than strand commuters. It put a price tag on the broad-based government's most expensive political compromise.

For 48 hours between Sunday, May 17 and Monday, May 18, Kenya looked like a country whose engine had stalled. Matatus stayed off the road. Boda boda riders parked. Roads in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Eldoret carried protesters rather than commuters. Four people died and at least thirty were injured according to Al Jazeera’s count, mostly from clashes with police. The trigger was a 23.5 percent fuel-price hike from the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority, layered on top of a 24.2 percent jump the previous month. By Tuesday, EPRA had rewritten its own pricing structure, dropping diesel by KSh10.06 per litre to KSh232.86 and reluctantly conceding that the previous review had been politically unsustainable.

That outcome should have been a victory. Instead, it became a damning audit of the Kenyatta-to-Ruto transition project that the late Raila Odinga’s allies had marketed to Kenyans as a “broad-based government” of competent technocrats. Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi and Energy Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi — both prized ODM imports — spent the strike on television offering rotating explanations: that the prices were already subsidised, that the Petroleum Development Levy Fund held KSh5 billion in reserve, that a VAT reduction “remained on the table”, and that the multi-agency meeting was being “arranged”. None of those statements amounted to a policy. Together they amounted to a tour of an empty room.

The most awkward feature of the strike was not the violence on the roads. It was the spectacle of two senior ODM technocrats discovering, in real time and on national television, the full operational consequences of the Iran-US war on Kenya’s pump prices. Brent crude has spiked more than 55 percent since fighting started in late February. The Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of global oil flows, has been intermittently closed. Murban crude, the grade Kenya buys, traded at $116.80 per barrel last week, up from $76.25 in early March. None of this was a secret. None of it was sudden. And yet Treasury was clearly caught flat-footed, with no contingency plan, no draft Bill, no emergency framework for cushioning the matatu sector and households simultaneously.

This is the part the political class will pretend not to have noticed. The broad-based government’s foundational pitch — made repeatedly by Mbadi, Wandayi and Wycliffe Oparanya since they crossed over in 2024 — was that ODM was bringing competence into a chaotic Kenya Kwanza administration. The 2026 fuel crisis is the first major external shock against which that claim has been tested, and the claim did not survive the test. The ministers were not in command of the facts. They were not in command of the numbers. They were not in command of the sequencing. When the strike was called off late on Monday after EPRA’s revised pricing structure, it was the public-transport operators who had effectively dictated the climbdown, not the cabinet.

President William Ruto, characteristically, was out of the country during the worst of it — landing in Astana for his state visit to Kazakhstan and announcing the establishment of a new Kenyan consulate. That image of Kenya’s president signing trade deals in Central Asia while citizens at home walked to work because they could not afford a matatu fare is not a frame his communications team can spin away. It is the frame of the moment.

For Kenya’s politics, the fuel strike has done three things. It has revived, for the first time since the late 2024 Gen-Z protests, the muscle memory of disruptive street action as a tool of policy reversal. It has hollowed out the technocratic alibi that ODM ministers were supposed to give the Kenya Kwanza administration. And it has confirmed, with hard numbers, the TIFA poll’s finding that UDA support has fallen from 38 percent in August 2022 to 17 percent in May 2026. Cost-of-living is no longer a campaign talking point. It is the binding constraint on the regime’s political viability.

The cabinet’s next move will reveal a great deal. A serious response would involve a published framework for managing fuel price shocks linked to the Iran war scenario, a temporary VAT carve-out for transport-grade diesel, a transparent accounting of the Petroleum Development Levy Fund, and a parliamentary statement from Treasury before the next EPRA review on June 14. An unserious response would involve another round of late-night statements, more multi-agency meetings, and the quiet hope that Kenyans will go back to absorbing the costs.

What is at stake here is not the political careers of two ministers. ODM’s bigger ambition — that its ministers prove they can govern, then leverage that record into a 2027 presidential candidacy or coalition seat — was supposed to be built on episodes like this one. The fuel strike will be remembered as the moment that ambition collided with reality. The next episode is coming, on schedule, when EPRA next sits down to do its monthly pricing review. The country will be watching whether the broad-based bargain has anything left to offer.

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