Africa & Regional

El Fasher Has Fallen. El-Obeid Is Next. And Africa Is Still Looking Away

After El Fasher's fall and fresh Amnesty findings of RSF atrocities, Sudan's war grinds toward el-Obeid — while the AU, IGAD and the EAC offer little beyond communiqués.

Amnesty International launched a report in Nairobi on July 1 that should have dominated African front pages. Its title — “City Under Siege, Children Under Fire” — describes what the Rapid Support Forces did to El Fasher, the North Darfur capital they captured on October 27 after an eighteen-month siege. The findings are catalogued in the flat language that human rights investigators use precisely because the facts are unbearable: crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, sexual violence, deliberate starvation. A separate UN investigation concluded the campaign amounted to genocide. And now the same paramilitary force is tightening its grip around el-Obeid, where half a million people are trapped and the UN is warning of an imminent “catastrophe.”

This is the third year of a war that began in April 2023 as a power struggle between two generals — the Sudanese Armed Forces under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti.” It has since metastasised into one of the largest humanitarian disasters on earth, and the least discussed. El Fasher was the last major Darfur city outside RSF control. Its fall completed the paramilitary’s conquest of the region and opened the road east toward Kordofan. El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, is the next domino, and the UN Human Rights Office expects it to become the next site of major ground fighting.

The scale of civilian harm has been magnified by a grim technological shift. UN High Commissioner Volker Türk reported that drone strikes killed more than a thousand Sudanese civilians in just the first five months of 2026, as both the RSF and the army increasingly wage war from the air over cities they cannot fully hold on the ground. Weapons that were once the preserve of major militaries are now routinely used to bombard neighbourhoods, and the supply chains that feed them run through foreign backers who face no consequences.

For a Kenyan and African readership, the uncomfortable question is not what is happening — Amnesty and the UN have documented that exhaustively — but why the continent’s own institutions have been so absent. The African Union, meeting for its 39th summit in Addis Ababa, has issued the requisite statements. IGAD, the regional bloc that includes Sudan, has been effectively paralysed, its credibility as a mediator undermined by member states quietly aligned with one side or the other. The much-invoked principle of “African solutions to African problems” has, in Sudan, produced neither solutions nor serious pressure. It has produced communiqués.

Kenya carries a particular awkwardness here. In early 2025, Nairobi hosted RSF-aligned political figures who used Kenyan soil to announce a parallel government — a move that infuriated Khartoum, ruptured relations, and made Kenya look, fairly or not, like a facilitator of the faction now accused of genocide. That episode should weigh on how Kenyan media and policymakers approach Sudan. It is not a distant tragedy about which we are neutral observers; it is a conflict our own diplomacy has touched, and not to its credit.

The analytical point worth making is that Sudan exposes the hollowness of the continent’s conflict-management architecture at precisely the moment it is most needed. The AU has a Peace and Security Council, a doctrine of non-indifference, and a stated ambition to “silence the guns.” Sudan is where that ambition goes to die quietly. When a paramilitary force can besiege, starve, and ethnically cleanse a regional capital over eighteen months while African institutions issue calls for dialogue, the doctrine is revealed as aspiration without instrument. The guns are not silent. They are louder, and now airborne.

There is also a hard-nosed strategic reason for Kenya and East Africa to care beyond the moral one. Sudan sits at the top of the Nile, borders South Sudan and the wider Horn, and produces refugee flows and instability that do not respect frontiers. A Sudan carved into warlord fiefdoms is a permanent source of insecurity for the entire region, a corridor for arms and fighters, and a rebuke to any claim that East Africa can manage its own neighbourhood. The EAC has spent the year absorbed in trade disputes and membership arithmetic while a genocide unfolded on the region’s northern flank.

What to watch: whether el-Obeid becomes the next El Fasher, and whether that finally forces a shift from statements to leverage — sanctions on the RSF’s foreign suppliers, real pressure on the states arming both sides, an African mediation effort with actual teeth. The pessimistic base case, unfortunately, is more of the same: expressions of deep concern, another Amnesty report in six months, and another city under siege. The most damning thing that can be said about the world’s response to Sudan is that it has become predictable. For a continent that insists on solving its own problems, that predictability is an indictment.

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