Africa & Regional

Sudan’s Drone War: 880 Dead, 20 Million Hungry, and Africa Still Has No Plan

The UN says drones now cause more than 80% of civilian deaths in Sudan, while nearly 20 million Sudanese face acute hunger. Khartoum has recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa. The continent's worst war is getting worse — and the African Union is missing.

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The headline number from the United Nations human rights office this month was not the body count, which is already obscene. It was the share. Of all the civilian deaths recorded in the first four months of 2026 in Sudan’s civil war, more than 80% were caused by drones. At least 880 civilians dead in 120 days, killed by weapons launched, in many cases, from outside the country. Sudan’s war has crossed a threshold. It is no longer a fight between two generals over a capital. It is a regional drone war fought above the heads of a population that is starving in real time.

The most explicit acknowledgement of this came on May 5, when Khartoum recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa and accused Ethiopia, alongside the United Arab Emirates, of being behind drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport. Sudan’s military command says it has evidence of at least four strikes launched from Ethiopian territory since early March, and that the UAE supplied the drones. Both Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi deny involvement. The denials matter less than the fact that Sudan’s government, having spent two years insisting that the war is an internal matter, is now openly naming foreign sponsors. The fig leaf is gone.

On the ground, the picture is just as bleak. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) confirmed this week that nearly 19.5 million Sudanese — close to half the country — are in acute food insecurity, with multiple regions already in famine conditions. Two weeks of clashes around Korodofan have killed at least 61 people, including nine children, according to a local medical group. On May 8, a drone strike on Al Quz in South Kordofan and another near El Obeid in North Kordofan killed 26 civilians in a single afternoon. And on May 14, drones struck a market in Mushaki in eastern Sudan, with the AFC/M23 framing in Congo nowhere near as analogous as the pattern suggests: armed groups using cheap, foreign-supplied air power to flatten civilian commerce.

RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, did not bother with diplomatic ambiguity. He told his fighters this month that they were prepared to keep fighting “until 2040 if necessary.” It is the kind of statement one is tempted to dismiss as bravado, but it is also a clear-eyed reading of the war economy. The Rapid Support Forces are funded by gold exports, sanctions-evading payment rails, and foreign sponsors who view Sudan as a leverage point on the Red Sea. The Sudanese Armed Forces are funded by Port Sudan customs receipts, Russian and Iranian arms transfers, and Egyptian air cover. Neither side is running out of money. The civilian population is running out of food.

Where is Africa in this? The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has issued the standard set of communiques. IGAD, paralysed by Ethiopia’s involvement, has effectively withdrawn from active mediation. The East African Community remains, for understandable reasons, focused on the Great Lakes. There is no continental envoy with the political weight — or the foreign-policy independence — to bring Burhan and Hemedti to the same room, and no donor bloc with the will to enforce a ceasefire. The Jeddah process, once advertised as the diplomatic track, has produced more communiques than corridors of safe passage. Africa’s worst war is being managed in Geneva and at the UN Security Council. That is a continental failure.

For Kenya, the lessons are uncomfortable. Nairobi hosted a Sudanese political process in 2024 that ended in recriminations from Khartoum. President William Ruto has since prioritised the DRC and the Africa–France summit. The Sudan file has gone cold. There is, however, a Kenyan national interest in this war that is not abstract. The Horn refugee corridor runs into Kakuma. Sudanese gold flows through Nairobi banking rails. Red Sea instability affects Kenyan tea and avocado exports. A continent that cannot stabilise its largest northern neighbour cannot credibly market itself as an investment frontier. €23 billion at Africa Forward will not change that math.

What to watch next: whether the UN Security Council can finally agree on a regional arms embargo that includes the UAE; whether Ethiopia denies Sudan’s allegations on the record or quietly absorbs the diplomatic cost; and whether the AU Commission, under new chair Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, can appoint an envoy with both gravitas and a budget. None of these are likely. All of them are necessary. Until then, the drones will keep coming, the famine will deepen, and the body count will keep climbing in eight-month increments.

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Written by koaphotography

A great photographer

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