Africa & Regional

A general defects, a drone war drags on: Sudan’s grinding new normal

An RSF brigadier walks off the battlefield as drones kill more than 880 Sudanese civilians in four months. Sudan's stalemate is now a regional proxy war — and East Africa has stopped trying to shape it.

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A senior commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces walked off the battlefield on Sunday, May 11, in a short video that has now travelled around the war’s many channels. Brigadier Ali Rizqallah — known in RSF ranks as Al-Savanna — announced his desertion in clipped Arabic and said he had reached the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum after a covert journey from Darfur, slipping past RSF checkpoints. He is the second senior RSF officer to defect this month, the third since 2024, and another data point in a war that, by month thirty-seven, has taught observers to be cautious about reading too much into individual switches.

Yet Al-Savanna’s defection is not negligible. It comes at a moment when the SAF and the RSF are locked in what the UN now calls a military impasse: SAF reconquered Khartoum a year ago and has formally moved its government back from the temporary capital in Port Sudan, but RSF still holds most of Darfur and continues to threaten supply lines into the western regions. The two sides have neither the manpower to finish each other nor the political incentive to negotiate. In that frozen middle, drone warfare has become the war’s defining technology and Sudan’s slowest, most quotidian killer.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights this week reported that armed drones caused more than eighty per cent of civilian deaths in Sudan during the first four months of 2026 — at least 880 deaths attributable to drones alone. A May 4 strike on Khartoum International Airport grounded all flights and disrupted aid corridors. Multiple targeted drone attacks hit Khartoum and Omdurman between April 28 and May 5. None of this requires the kind of large infantry advance that used to be tracked on situation maps in Western capitals. It requires patience, off-the-shelf drones, and a willingness to accept that civilians will die.

The diplomatic dimension is hardening as well. Khartoum has escalated its public accusations against Ethiopia, alleging that RSF drone strikes are being launched from Ethiopian territory — a claim Addis Ababa denies but one that fits Sudan’s pattern of widening its enemies list. RSF is reported to be building up forces near the Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle, evidently preparing a new route into Darfur. Egypt is signalling continued support for the SAF. The Emirates remain widely understood to be backing the RSF, though officially they deny it. The bottom line is that Sudan’s civil war has become a regionalised proxy struggle that none of its regional backers seem in a hurry to end.

For Kenya, this is not a distant catastrophe. Sudanese refugees and businesspeople have steadily reshaped neighbourhoods of Nairobi and Mombasa over the past two years; remittances flow back through Kenyan banks; and the East African Community is now hosting the second-largest Sudanese diaspora outside the Gulf. President William Ruto’s foreign policy team led the so-called Nairobi Process for Sudan in 2024, an effort that briefly looked like the most credible African mediation attempt. It collapsed. Its successor, the IGAD-AU-Sudan trilateral mechanism, has been almost invisible in 2026, and Kenya’s diplomatic energy has rotated towards the DRC track instead. The cost of that drift is that East Africa is now a downstream consumer of a war it has stopped trying to shape.

The humanitarian numbers are difficult to absorb at scale. The UN estimates that more than thirty-three million Sudanese are now in need of humanitarian assistance — what aid agencies describe, without much rhetorical flourish, as the world’s largest hunger crisis. Famine has been formally declared in parts of Darfur, North Kordofan and Khartoum. Cholera is endemic in displacement camps. Three years into the war, the systems that once functioned — schools, banks, the central bureaucracy — exist mostly as bureaucratic ghosts.

What does Al-Savanna’s defection actually change? Probably very little on the battlefield, in the short term. He brings intelligence on RSF logistics in Darfur, he gives SAF a propaganda win, and he reinforces a creeping perception inside RSF ranks that the war can no longer be won outright. None of that, by itself, ends the fighting. It does, however, weaken the political proposition that General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti”, presents to his commanders: that the RSF is on an inevitable march to victory.

What to watch next: whether further senior RSF defections follow in the next four weeks; whether the IGAD-AU mechanism is revived with serious Kenyan or Ethiopian leadership; and whether the drone war prompts a long-overdue international restriction on the transfer of armed drones to non-state actors. None of these are likely. All of them would matter. In the meantime, Sudan keeps providing the rest of the continent with a quiet, terrible lesson: a war can settle into a stalemate, and the stalemate can still kill nine hundred civilians in four months. That is the new normal Africa is being asked to live with.

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Written by koaphotography

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